The Nature of Necessity by Alvin Plantinga

In so doing, the paper explains why the notion of what is broadly logically possible/necessary ought to be distinguished from the notion of what is metaphysically possible/necessary. Part D Is devoted to an examination of the nature of the modality involved in possible world semantics. In part C I set forth why the Anti-PMOA-Argument is amply confirmed because the procedure followed in the construction of the PMOA plausibly allows the construction of arguments relevantly similar to but inconsistent with it because such rival arguments prove either the existence in all possible worlds of beings relevantly similar to but different from that of god conceived as a maximally excellent being (as defined in the PMOA)–or, what is more striking, the existence in all possible worlds of several conceivable maximally excellent beings that nevertheless constitutively or otherwise differ from each other in some important respects. I thereby rigorously show that despite appearances a maximally great being is not broadly logically possible. In part B, I expound and defend what I call the “Anti - Plantinga Modal Ontological Argument - Argument” (Anti-PMOA-Argument). In part A I set forth the definitions and premises of the PMOA and its conclusions, and disclose its flawed underlying assumptions. In this paper I examine the modal ontological argument based upon possible worlds semantics expounded by Alvin Plantinga (PMOA), and as further developed and defended by William Lane Craig.

Contra Willenborg, the possibility of the antecedent of (EP) does not entail Theism and Arguments from Evil that employ (EP) not only (a) provide reason to suppose Atheism is true, but also (b) provide the required epistemic justification for the rejection of the key premise of the Modal Ontological Argument. I argue that Willenborg is incorrect with respect to the first horn. On the other hand, if the antecedent of (EP) is impossible then (EP) cannot be epistemically justified. Willenborg argues that if the antecedent of (EP) is possible it entails Theism by the Modal Ontological Argument. Willenborg argues that there is a conditional premise-(EP)-that is essential to any Argument from Evil and which ensures that no such argument can meet both conditions (i) and (ii). According to Willenborg, the two conditions that must be met are the following: (i) the argument must lower the probability of Theism being true beyond an acceptable epistemic threshold, and (ii) the argument must not employ any premises that entail the truth of Theism.

Michael Willenborg argues that no Argument from Evil can meet two necessary conditions for a successful piece of atheology.

The Nature of Necessity by Alvin Plantinga